Following its jurisdictional decision in
Introduction
The South China Sea issue has brought to the fore the serious disputes in this region, including multi-level contestations among the coastal States. At the core are the territorial disputes among China (mainland and Taiwan), the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei over certain maritime features, 1 and the maritime delimitation disputes arising from overlapping maritime claims among Indonesia and those aforementioned five States. The outer layer of the South China Sea issue is characterized as conflicting claims over rights of fishing and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources, and different views on certain concepts such as "freedom of navigation" and 'scientific research.' 2 China has been maintaining that disputes concerning territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation should be peacefully resolved through negotiations between countries directly concerned.
3 Its declaration was filed on August 25, 2006 pursuant to Article 298(1) of the UNCLOS in order to exclude specified categories of disputes, particularly concerning sea boundary delimitations from compulsory procedures under the UNCLOS. This is in line with the consistent position of China. In this context, a default rule was applied to unilaterally initiate the arbitral proceedings against China and to establish an ad hoc tribunal (hereafter the Tribunal) under Annex VII of the UNCLOS.
4
Consistent with its long-standing policy, China chose not to participate in this arbitration. On December 7, 2014, China released a Position Paper articulating in detail China's position and the justification thereof, and the rationale for the Tribunal's lack of jurisdiction.
5 Treating China's Position Paper as effectively constituting a plea concerning its jurisdiction, the Tribunal convened a hearing on jurisdiction Although China's non-appearance per se may not constitute a bar to the proceedings, it left the Tribunal a duty to consider on its own initiatives all rules of international law that may be relevant to ascertain its jurisdiction. 7 However, as illustrated in the following paragraphs, this duty was not properly fulfilled. By purposely adopting a double standard in characterizing the dispute and fragmenting the maritime delimitation dispute between China and the Philippines, the Tribunal regrettably expanded its competence and empowered itself to touch upon the issues of major significance even if they had been explicitly and admittedly excluded from any compulsory procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the UNCLOS.
The Pro-Jurisdictional Bias in the Identification and Characterization of the Dispute
Section 2 of Part XV of the UNCLOS delineates the threshold of compulsory procedures controlling binding decisions in the compromissory clause of Article 286, which provides:
Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.
Article 286 sets out at least three conditions for applying compulsory procedures: first, the submitted dispute is concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS; second, the submitted dispute is not one of the matters limited or
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The Tribunal declared jurisdiction and admissibility in Submissions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14(d) . It supported the Philippines' claims therein.
7
The rights of the non-appearing party are safeguarded by the arbitral tribunal's obligation under Article 9 of the UNCLOS Annex VII to 'satisfy itself' propriomotu. Therefore, the tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute and the claim is well founded in fact and law. (1) and 298(1)(a), a common wording, 'concerning,' is seen. Articles 286 and 288(1) vest compulsory jurisdiction in courts or tribunals provided for in Article 287(1) with regard to "disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention," while Article 298(1)(a) restricts the jurisdiction by providing that a State may declare that it does not accept compulsory procedures with respect to "disputes concerning the interpretation or application of Articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, …" [Emphasis added] The term, 'concerning' used in these provisions, when interpreted in good faith with the ordinary meaning given to them in their context and in the light of its object and purpose as specified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, suggests the disputes, either included or excluded, a broader scope than merely "the interpretation or application of this Convention," "the interpretation or application of Articles 15, 74 and 83" or "sea boundary delimitations." 9 As has been found in a couple of recent cases, a pro-jurisdiction bias was also typified by Sienho Yee argued that such terms as 'concerning,' 'relating to' and 'involving' … are all terms that give the word 'dispute' a substantive scope or coverage broader than the content of "the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83," "sea boundary delimitations" or "historic bays or titles," even if such content is to be given a strict interpretation. The use of the term "concerning" in the declaration indicates that the declaration does not extend only to articles which expressly contain the word "arrest" or "detention"
but to any provision of the Convention having a bearing on the arrest or detention of vessels. This interpretation is reinforced by taking into account the intention of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … that the declaration … was meant to cover all claims connected with the arrest or detention of its vessels…
12
Another example of flexible construction of jurisdictional authorization arises when a submitted issue contains two or more concurrent disputes with distinct aspects. The arbitral tribunal in Chagos Marine Protect Area adopted an evaluating approach in determining whether the mixed disputes submitted by Mauritius should be properly characterized as concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS so that they fell within the scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction:
10 The M/V "Louisa," id. This 'primary-ancillary' test in Chago Marine Protect Area is essentially in line with the tactic adopted in 'Louisa,' for the expansive reading of the word 'concerning' helped secure the jurisdiction over matters that were not per se "the arrest or detention of its vessels" 14 or the interpretation or application of the Convention. Without exception, such an expansive interpretation of jurisdictional mandates is also applied in the current South China Sea Award. When examining the nature of the Philippines' first two submissions in relation to the validity of China's "ninedash line" and claims to 'historic rights,' the Tribunal first pointed out that they reflected a dispute concerning the interaction of China's claimed 'historic rights' with the UNCLOS provisions, in particular, a dispute concerning the interaction of the UNCLOS with another instrument or body of law.
15 Without any explanation, the Tribunal then quickly jumped to the conclusion that this type of dispute "is unequivocally a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention." 16 However, it is not that easy to perceive the 'unequivocal' connection between such interaction of two bodies of law and the interpretation or application of the Convention unless an implied logic that the former is "having a bearing on" the latter. 17 In other words, since the question of whether or not the rights arising under history and customary international law were preserved by the UNCLOS has something to do with the interpretation and application of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf regime, following the 'Louisa' rule, the Tribunal held that the Philippine's first two submissions should be identified as disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention, 18 thus the first jurisdictional threshold was satisfied.
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Through such expansive readings on the literal meaning of the compromissory clause, the South China Sea tribunal extended its power to the issues that are governed by another body of law. As explained in subsection (B), this expansive approach is in a striking contrast to the tactics employed in interpreting jurisdictional exceptions.
B. A Narrow Reading of Jurisdictional Exceptions: High-Threshold Barrier
While Article 288 (1) The effect of this declaration is an absolute exclusion from compulsory procedures of all claims referred to in Article 298(1)(a)(b) and (c). This exclusion will be applied to "disputes concerning … sea boundary delimitations" as in the application of the South China Sea case. [Emphasis added] Again, the word such like 'concerning' plays a vital role in shaping the scope of this exclusion. Does Article 298(1)(a) cover anything other than delineating a sea boundary line? Following the logic in aforementioned cases, the question answers itself. Unexpectedly however, the Tribunal negated this common understanding.
In examining the Philippines' submissions on the legal status and entitlements the interpretation or application of the Convention. The second is that they are not limited or excluded by the provisions of Section 2 of the UNCLOS. After concluding that the first threshold was satisfied in the preliminary award, the Tribunal went on, in the final award, to examine whether these disputes were covered by the exclusion from jurisdiction in Article 298(1)(a)(i) for disputes concerning "historic bays or titles." The Tribunal also denied this possibility, holding it had jurisdiction to consider the Philippines' Submission Nos. Here, the Tribunal mysteriously replaced 'concerning' with 'over.' This seems to imply the Tribunal's intention to narrow the scope of the excluded matter stipulated in Article 298(1)(a) down to purely drawing a line. In its final award, however, the Tribunal tried to make up for its previous analytical failure, correcting its 'mistaken' wording in the preliminary award by enclosing the word 'concern' in quotation:
In brief, a dispute over the source and existence of maritime entitlements does not "concern" sea boundary delimitation merely because the existence of overlapping entitlements is a necessary condition for delimitation. While all sea boundary delimitation will concern entitlements, the converse is not the case: all disputes over entitlements do not concern delimitation. … The exception in Article 298(1)(a)(i) of the Convention does not reach so far as to capture a dispute over the existence of entitlements that may -or may not -ultimately require delimitation. especially 'Louisa.' The Louisa tribunal not only extended the declaration to the UNCLOS provisions 'having a bearing on' the arrest or detention of vessels, but also looked into the intent of the declarant. It explained the declaration "was meant to cover all claims connected with" the exact wording of the text. [Emphasis added] It is apparent that an entitlement claim, commonly forming the first step in sea boundary delimitation, certainly is connected with / has a bearing on maritime delimitation and ought to be identified as part of the disputes concerning the sea boundary delimitation. [Emphasis added] Second, it is doubtful whether the Tribunal's narrow interpretation accords with the original intent of this exemption clause. Article 298(1)(a) was a balanced compromise between a general reluctance to allow reservations to the Convention, and an insistence of some delegations on excluding certain categories of disputes from third-party adjudication.
26 Given the sensitivity of the maritime delimitation issue and its inherent connection with an entitlement claim, one question must arise: Is it reasonable to expect that those who had made declarations under Article 298 of the UNCLOS excluding disputes concerning sea boundary delimitations from compulsory procedures would be willing to accept the reality that any implicit question pertaining to the excluded matters may circumvent this exemption? Allowing such a circumvention would go contrary to the original intention of the States Parties whose acceptance of the whole package of the UNCLOS was premised on the full respect of their aspiration embedded in the text of both Article 298(1)(a) and their declarations. It seems apparent that the Tribunal was applying a double standard to secure its jurisdiction. The pro-jurisdictional bias has led the arbitrators to embrace maximalist protective positions. In turn, it has translated into "lenient entry, stringent exit" strategy, 27 which leaves the legitimacy of the ruling under question.
The Tribunal's Questionable Approach of Fragmenting A Delimitation Dispute
The legal status of certain maritime features as well as the maritime entitlement generated thereof was one of the core issues challenged by the Philippines. 
A. Application of Article 121 in Maritime Delimitation
Both the UNCLOS and customary international law grant islands, regardless of their size, the same status on generating maritime zones as a land territory. In practice, Article 121(3) was often referred to by one party in a maritime delimitation for the purpose of enlarging its own maritime claim or curtailing that of the other. However, courts or tribunals hearing such cases tended to circumvent this highly controversial issue through a series of systematic rules and methods, and delimited the boundary line following the equity principle. As a matter of fact, even if an island (other than a rock) is in principle entitled to produce full jurisdictional zones, its effect on delimiting the continental shelf or exclusive economic zone depends on the peculiarity of a given situation. As considerations of equity gives islands various effects in determining entitlements to maritime areas, islands may generate full or partial maritime spaces, or none at all.
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It is impressive to understand that even an island entitled to full maritime zones under Article 121 may only be given partial effect or no effect at all on delimiting a maritime boundary in accordance with Articles 15, 74 or 83. Why do island status and its effects on delimitation not exactly correspond? It is because sea-boundary delimitation, as a comprehensive framework, requires prudent consideration of a variety of factors. Apart from the presence of islands, other circumstanceslength and shape of respective coastlines, the existence of third States, historical circumstances, etc. -also play a crucial role in this whole process.
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Also, the evasive manner of international adjudication should be further explained in relation to the status and entitlement of islands in the areas to be delimited. When adjudicating disputes on maritime delimitation, the ICJ provided: the Court shall "find its objective justification in considerations lying not outside but within the rules." 37 However, given "the considerable and unresolved controversy as to the exact meaning and scope of the principle" embodied in Article 121 (3) To this extent, it is not surprising that so far the overwhelming majority of cases, except South China Sea, have been reluctant to apply Article 121(3) and preferred to leave this conundrum ambiguous as it is. 39 The reluctance and evasive manner are a fair reaction to the lack of a clear-cut applicable rule on the definition of 'rock' and the unambiguous duty to adjudicate "within the rules." It would explain why any mandatory rule has not developed with regard to the effects of islands in maritime delimitation disputes, but instead a common practice has established to treat islands as 'special' or 'relevant' circumstances to be considered in each act of delimitation.
40

B. The Justiciability of Entitlement Claim in Overlapping Areas
As mentioned above, in South China Sea, the entitlement claim in overlapping areas was held a distinct issue from maritime delimitation as an independent dispute. The only exceptional scenario the Tribunal inferred is the situation of an isolated small maritime feature, located in the middle of the open sea and far away from the mainland. This reasoning, however, is simply not tenable, because it would be preposterous to separate the issue of legal status and entitlement of features which is inherent to a delimitation dispute from the maritime delimitation process only because the former could occur in another situation. Nonetheless, this reminds us of the necessity to explore the most fundamental question: Can the legal status and entitlement issue in South China Sea be adjudicated before a court or a tribunal? It negates this justiciability test for the following reasons: First, an entitlement claim and a delimitation dispute are mutually dependent and interactive. For one thing, an equitable solution on delimitation requires a fair consideration of possible effects arising from relevant maritime features, while ascertaining the entitlements of the parties commonly comes from the comprehensive process of maritime delimitation. The delimitation of the EEZ or the continental shelf usually proceeds in three steps: (1) identifying basepoints, relevant coasts and areas; 41 (2) a construction of a provisional delimitation line and possible adjustment given relevant circumstances so as to achieve an equitable solution; and (3) a disproportionality test on the effect of the line in case the parties' respective shares of the relevant areas are markedly disproportionate to their respective relevant coasts. 42 The existence of an island or groups of islands has been regarded as special or pertinent circumstances to be taken into consideration before finalizing a maritime boundary. Kwiatkowska and Soons also noted that an entitlement issue forms an inherent part of a maritime delimitation: from its soil on relevant maritime delimitation disputes will lead to an arbitrary decision which is not only ineffective but also inoperative in solving differences.
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Second, a court or a tribunal is not judicially able to delineate the maximum limit of a contesting State. When there exists overlapping areas between two neighboring States, the two interested parties would commonly carry out consultation, negotiation or arrangements of other forms in order to reach a compromised plan that can accommodate their needs. Under normal circumstances, the parties may gradually modify or adjust their maritime claims in these interim arrangements before reaching a final agreement. This is a highly autonomous process which accords closely with political ends so that the parties might not entirely follow the exact rule in the UNCLOS or other treaty. Although both parties sometimes, based on mutual consent, resort to the compulsory procedures provided for in the UNCLOS Part XV, 46 it does not grant a court or a tribunal express or implied power to interfere with the decision-making that ought to be carried out bilaterally between the States directly concerned. In other words, no court can make the final decision on a party's maximum limit of maritime claim. Before, the two States used to enter into provisional arrangements or official negotiation relating to the delimitation, much less an ad hoc arbitral tribunal unilaterally initiated. The reason is clear and simple: Entitlements that one party could have earned out of reciprocity in the process of bilateral negotiation are very likely to be ruled out by third-party adjudication if solely based on the ambiguous provision of Article 121(3).
47
Third, the Tribunal set up a clear-cut and even unprecedentedly high standard for the long-debated principle on 'rocks.' As illustrated in the above paragraphs, the 'intolerably imprecise' provision of Article 121(3) appears to be "a perfect recipe for confusion and conflict," 48 and barely leaves any explicit rule to follow. It is dubious whether a court or a tribunal can justify its enforcement over the status and entitlement claim of an island deeply rooted in an overlapping geographic framework. Worse still, the Philippines' status and entitlement claim involves
If Article 121, paragraph 3 has any role to play, it would seem to consist in signaling the necessity of giving the question of 'rock' careful consideration, with the implementation of the rocks-principle rightly remaining in most cases a matter for application of equity to maritime boundary delimitation in which islands are involved. a package of conundrums, including, inter alia, territorial disputes over these contested features, the status of the Spratly Islands as a single geographic unit, the indispensable third party theory, etc. which exponentially exaggerate the complexity of the issue in question. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal in South China Sea not only recklessly decided to exercise its power, but also attempted to fulfill its ambition of reshuffling the maritime order by means of establishing an unparalleled threshold for "fully entitled island." 49 This hasty move can jeopardize the legitimacy of the award as well as the integrity and authority of the UNCLOS. It thus calls for a more prudent examination on the question of justifiability. In our context, Judge Petrén's separate opinion in Western Sahara Advisory Opinion seems especially apposite. When considering the application of the self-determination principle in the face of two conflicting pre-colonial territorial claims, he commented:
It seems however that questions of this kind are not yet considered ripe for submission to the Court. The reason is doubtless the fact that the wide variety of geographical and other data which must be taken into account in questions of decolonization have not yet allowed of the establishment of a sufficiently developed body of rules and practice to cover all the situations which may give rise to problems. In other words, although its guiding principles have emerged, the law of decolonization does not yet constitute a complete body of doctrine and practice. It is thus natural that political forces should be constantly at work rendering more precise and complete the content of that law in specific cases like that of Western Sahara...
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Last but not least, there is a paradox throughout this case. Assuming China agrees to comply with the award, the rulings and findings on the legal status and entitlement of maritime features will consequently serve as a premise for the future negotiation between China and the Philippines on maritime delimitation. It ironically proves that the two issues are deeply entangled so that they would consequently repudiate the alleged precondition and foundation of the award in question. This partially explains China's "non-participation, non-recognition, non-acceptance and noncompliance" position on this case. As for China, it is essentially a legal trap that would put it in an unjust and embarrassing situation at any cost.
Conclusion
The South China Sea Arbitration was an unprecedentedly complex case. It brought together most complicated questions in the field of international adjudication, inter alia, mixed disputes involving competing territorial claims, rock principle, the correlation between an entitlement claim of relevant features and the dispute of maritime delimitation, the exemption situations of historic title, maritime delimitation and military activities, the issue of indispensable third party, etc. Here, the Philippines made full use of tactic for packaging and splitting unactionable core disputes into issues concerning the application and interpretation of the UNCLOS. However, the Tribunal's biased construction of both jurisdictional and substantive provisions is causing more worries of abusing not only legal process but also judicial discretion. Such an advanced law-making impulse comes at the expense of the consistency and legitimacy of international jurisprudence. It will finally impair the integrity and authority of international law.
